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ENTWINING THOMISTIC AND ANSELMIAN 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ATONEMENT1
Joshua Thurow and Jada Twedt Strabbing 
In Atonement, Eleonore Stump develops a novel and compelling Thomistic 
account of the atonement and argues that Anselmian interpretations must be 
rejected. In this review essay, after summarizing her account, we raise wor-
ries about some aspects of it. First, we respond to her primary objection to 
Anselmian interpretations by arguing that, contrary to Stump, love does not 
require unilateral and unconditional forgiveness. Second, we suggest that the 
heart of Anselmian interpretations—that reconciliation with God requires rep-
aration/restitution/satisfaction—is plausible and well-supported by some of 
her own arguments. Third, we raise doubts about her views of the role of sur-
render in justification and the nature of justification itself. Finally, we question 
whether Stump’s account can successfully explain how the atonement deals 
with pre-justification sin. A central theme of our comments is that Stump’s 
Thomistic interpretation can be entwined with Anselmian interpretations to 
make a stronger account of the atonement.
Eleonore Stump’s Atonement is a monumental achievement in analytic 
philosophical theology. At once it builds on her lifelong project of explicat-
ing and extending Aquinas’s philosophical theology while also offering a 
novel interpretation of the atonement. Her interpretation—which late in 
the book she calls a “Marian” interpretation—also constitutes a defense 
of the doctrine of the atonement. The doctrine and its traditional inter-
pretations, including especially variations on Anselmian interpretations, 
have long faced a host of objections. Stump repudiates Anselmian inter-
pretations and argues that her Marian interpretation—a Thomistic inter-
pretation—avoids the many objections to other kinds of interpretations. 
In addition, she argues that her interpretation (a) dovetails with plausible 
interpretations of a variety of Biblical texts, especially the cry of dereliction 
and the temptations of Christ, (b) explains how the atonement deals with 
the problem of shame (not just with the problem of guilt for wrongdoing), 
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1A review of Atonement, by Eleonore Stump. Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. xv + 538. 
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and (c) weaves together the benefits brought about by Christ’s atonement 
and the benefits that justify God in allowing suffering (according to the 
theodicy she presents in her 2010 book, Wandering in Darkness). Insofar 
as the Marian interpretation is plausible—especially as compared to its 
rivals—Stump shows the continuing relevance and vitality of Aquinas’s 
work for contemporary philosophical theology (analytic or otherwise).
There is too much in this rich and dense book for us to survey, much 
less evaluate, in even a lengthy book review. Since the Marian interpreta-
tion touches on so many aspects of philosophy and theology—the incar-
nation, the nature of God’s presence, the nature of love, grace and free 
will, justification, sanctification, satisfaction, sacrifice, interpretation of 
Biblical passages, shame, guilt, and forgiveness, just to name a few—dif-
ferent readers will be drawn, critically or appreciatively, to different ele-
ments of her interpretation. In this review we begin with an overview of 
the book’s primary positive contribution: the Marian interpretation of the 
atonement. Then we discuss some questions and objections about four 
pieces of her interpretation: (a) her view on the relationship between love 
and forgiveness, (b) her repudiation of Anselmian views, (c) her views 
about surrender and its role in justification, which on her account Jesus’s 
atonement is aimed at securing, and (d) her view of the role that Christ’s 
mind-reading of human sin plays in the atonement. We do not present any 
objections or questions as decisive refutations of Stump’s view; we think 
that even if our objections are sound many elements of her Marian inter-
pretation will stand. Indeed, we think that most elements of her view can 
fit into certain Anselmian views. If we’re right about that, she has done 
even more than she thinks—she hasn’t simply trimmed one dying branch 
and tended another growing branch of atonement theory; she has tended 
both branches and enabled them to intertwine.
1. The Marian Interpretation of the Atonement
Christ’s atonement solves a problem for humanity, the nature of which 
is indicated by the meaning of the word “atonement”—“making one of 
things that were previously not at one.”2 The problem is that we are not 
at one with God because of sin and its effects. The goal of Christ’s atone-
ment is thus to bring humanity and God back to being at one with each 
other, and to do so, the atonement needs to deal with the primary obstacle 
preventing such union—sin. Sin has various elements which all contribute 
to putting a distance between humans and God, including: occurrent dis-
positions to moral wrongdoing, guilt (including how it affects one’s psy-
che and its effects on the world), shame, and a stain on the soul (which 
includes the psychic effects of knowing what is was like to do and want 
to do something wrong and the continued separation one can experience 
from other people who are aware of the wrong one has done). The atone-
ment should eliminate these obstacles to union and bring about the desired 
2Stump 2018, Atonement, 15.
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union. Stump argues that the desired union is a union of love between God 
and humans. Stump here draws on her earlier work defending a Thomistic 
account of love, according to which love requires two things: desire for the 
good of the beloved and desire for union with the beloved. God always 
loves every human being and so has both desires toward each human. On 
Stump’s view, this means that God forgives every human unilaterally and 
unconditionally. God’s forgiveness is not conditional on humans placating 
or honoring God in order to make up for their sin. So the primary obsta-
cle to union with God lies in humans—they do not possess these desires 
of love towards God. Thus the aim of the atonement is to produce a full 
union between humans and God, which requires producing in humans the 
desires of love for God, while also resolving the problem of sin.
The union of love between two people requires closeness and shared 
attention. You are close to your beloved only if your beloved (i) shares 
with you his/her thoughts and feelings that reveal who he/she is and 
what he/she cares about, (ii) desires you (not just desires certain states 
of affairs that happen to involve you), and (iii) his/her desire is whole-
hearted (not just desiring you and desiring things involving you, but also 
desiring to desire you and those things). Shared attention is a kind of 
second-person presence to someone; your beloved shares attention with 
you when she is attentive to you by listening to you and attempting to 
understand the world through your perspective. This requires empathy 
and mind-reading.
On this view of love, union of course comes in degrees. You can share 
your thoughts and feelings with your beloved to various degrees, desire 
her to various degrees, be more or less wholehearted, and be more or less 
attentive. Likewise, there are various obstacles that can stand in the way 
of union.
According to Stump, the only obstacles to God’s union in love with 
us come from us. God is fully willing to share who he is with us; we just 
need to turn to him and to cease resisting his love in order to see who 
he is. God desires us fully, wholeheartedly. He desires the good for us as 
well; indeed his desire of the good for us is coextensive with his desire for 
union with us because, according to Stump (following Aquinas) the great-
est good for a human is union with God. Furthermore, God is fully atten-
tive to us. He of course knows all of our thoughts and feelings at all times. 
But Stump thinks that Jesus’s passion provides something distinctive to 
God’s attention with us. She suggests that Jesus’s cry of dereliction on the 
cross—“my God, my God, why have you forsaken me”—can be plausibly 
interpreted as Jesus’ experiencing the loss of shared attention with God, 
and the cause of that loss is the psychic anguish Jesus experiences from, 
all at once, using “his human mind and the power of his divine nature 
to mind-read at once the entire mind of every human being existing at 
every time and space.”3 In such a state, Jesus in a sense bears the sins of 
3Stump 2018, Atonement, 164.
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the world; he isn’t literally guilty of any of the wrongs other humans have 
done, but he knows exactly what everyone has done and what it is like to 
do those wrong things. The weight of this awareness, given the sheer mass 
of human sin, is immensely painful. Through this massive mind-reading 
during the passion, God is sharing attention with every human at all times 
in all their sinfulness. This aspect of the passion is part of the work of 
atonement because our minds are in Christ’s mind, which is one half of 
mutual indwelling—the state in which God and a human both manifest a 
deep shared awareness of each other.
So God loves all humans at all times fully. He has provided his side of 
union to the extent that he can without human cooperation. Humans sim-
ply need to turn to God in love, giving their part of closeness and shared 
attention. Stump follows Aquinas in supposing that all humans desire the 
good at some level. When we decide to do something, the intellect pre-
sents actions to us as good, and the will is attracted to do something pre-
sented to us as good. This implies that whenever someone acts wrongly, 
they are not wholehearted. The only way a person can be wholehearted 
is if their desires are united around the good. A lack of wholeheartedness 
prevents union with others because “if he is internally divided in what he 
cares about, then whichever part of his divided will another person is in 
harmony with, she will be separated from some other part.”4 So in order 
for a human to be fully united with anyone in love, that person needs to be 
wholeheartedly in favor of the good. Obviously, humans are not so whole-
hearted, and thus there is an obstacle to union with God. Furthermore, 
humans are unable to bring themselves into a wholehearted desire for 
the good precisely because, in their lack of wholeheartedness, they don’t 
desire it!5 Part of what the atonement needs to do to bring about union 
between humans and God is instill in humans a wholehearted desire for 
the good.
A wholehearted desire for the good (and for God, since God is the 
supreme good) requires two things: first, a second-order desire for the 
good (i.e., a desire to desire the good), and second, integration between 
one’s first and second order desires regarding the good. Stump, follow-
ing her interpretation of Aquinas, says that post-Fall humans lack the sec-
ond-order desire to desire the good and are unable to bring themselves to 
acquire it. It must therefore come from faith, from God’s “operative grace” 
acting on our will. Justification is then constituted by the formation of 
this second-order desire. As Stump says, “the will of faith is therefore the 
global second-order will to have, through God’s help, a will that wills the 
good, universally understood. The formation of this will of faith in a per-
son is his justification.”6 The integration between first-and second-order 
4Stump 2018, Atonement, 59.
5Stump 2018 eloquently describes the puzzle humans face in changing their will at 
Atonement, 200.
6Stump, Atonement, 204–205.
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desires occurs through the process of sanctification. Once someone has 
come to faith (and so is justified), the Holy Spirit comes to indwell that 
person, giving humans a rich form of second-person attention of God. 
The indwelling of the Holy Spirit affords the greatest possible closeness 
between humans and God and enables a human to be directly attentive to 
God’s mind and character. So long as a human continues to allow the Holy 
Spirit to work within himself, the person will slowly become more inte-
grated around the good. Furthermore, this process preserves the human’s 
free will because, during sanctification, God through the Holy Spirit is 
cooperating with the human’s second-order will for a will that wills the 
good. This work of the Holy Spirit is God’s “cooperative grace.”
Faith received through operative grace is also consistent with a per-
son’s free will because faith is received when a person surrenders to God. 
In surrender, a person ceases to resist God’s love and grace, but she does 
not yet accept it either. Her will is “quiescent” regarding God’s grace.7 
God grants faith to those with a quiescent will, and with faith comes a will 
to will the good, which as we have seen is necessary both for closeness 
with God (which is one aspect of the union of love) and for the process of 
sanctification, which over time produces a more integrated, wholehearted 
union with God.
Union of a human with God in love thus depends on one crucial 
event: surrender to God. And a person on her own cannot bring herself 
to surrender to God. How then can this event come about? The atone-
ment, on Stump’s view, answers this question. Stump argues that people 
often reject and resist the love of others, even when at the same time they 
desire love. Love carries vulnerability—the risk of rejection—because it 
involves opening up to another and revealing one’s warts and flaws and 
vices. One naturally fears that others will reject oneself after seeing all of 
these things. Love also involves uniting with the beloved, which means 
one won’t be able to entirely “determine things for himself by himself.”8 
Christ’s atonement—in particular his passion and death on the cross—
provides the “most suitable remedy, the one most likely to work, for a 
heart that needs to melt: God incarnate enduring real suffering and real 
death, in love, and so also in forgiveness, for those in need of that love.”9 
By suffering and dying on the cross, God, the supreme good, shows his 
concern for humans by living a life like theirs, undistinguished, filled with 
regular human challenges and pain. And he suffers the worst of it to feel 
and show his concern for humanity. This naturally evokes human sympa-
thy and empathy and melts our fears of rejection.
So, on Stump’s view, one of the primary things Christ’s passion and 
death achieves by way of atonement is that it helps bring about the sur-





human side of the closeness that is required in a union of love with God. 
The other two primary things the atonement does (mentioned earlier) are 
to enable humans in their suffering and sin to indwell God by Christ’s 
mind-reading every human throughout history in all their sinfulness (this 
provides God’s part of the mutual awareness love requires), and to bring 
about the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in humans (which happens con-
sequent to surrender to God and receiving faith), which provides for the 
human part of the mutual awareness that love requires.
Stump argues that these three aspects of Christ’s atonement resolve the 
problem of sin in all its dimensions. First, the disposition to sin is resolved. 
This happens through justification and sanctification, and Christ’s atone-
ment enables these processes. Second, the guilt of sin is resolved. Christ’s 
atonement brings people to surrender to God, which enables God to 
infuse them with faith, and faith involves a recognition and repentance 
for one’s sins. This partly resolves guilt. Stump grants that some cases of 
wrongdoing are serious enough that a full resolution of guilt requires the 
wrongdoer to make amends (or offer satisfaction). She does not think that 
satisfaction needs to be offered to God; he unilaterally forgives and is ready 
to reconcile as soon as they are ready to turn to him. However, humans 
often need to offer satisfaction to the human victims of their wrongdoing. 
The second-order will to will the good, as it works through one’s first 
order desires and wills in sanctification, will lead one to do what one can 
to make amends with the victims of one’s wrongdoing. But often people 
cannot do enough to make full amends—either due to circumstances or 
due to the severity of the wrongdoing. Christ offers vicarious satisfaction 
for these wrongs. He offers satisfaction because his atonement is a great 
good offered to humanity, as it attracts and enables people to enter into a 
union of love with God, which is the greatest good for a human. So Christ, 
through his atonement, offers a very great good to every human being; a 
good that is “more than enough to compensate any human suffering.”10 
If a human wrongdoer is united in love with Christ regarding Christ’s 
satisfaction, then this very great good that Christ offers to all counts as 
vicarious satisfaction for the wrongdoing of the human. Here Stump 
emphasizes one of the benefits of her Marian interpretation of the atone-
ment—it provides a connection between atonement and theodicy. Part of 
what justifies God in allowing evil and suffering is precisely that, through 
their suffering, God can offer people a much better good. Suffering can 
enable a person in grace to draw closer to God in love. Suffering can also, 
through identification with the sufferings of Christ, draw one who is not 
in grace to surrender to Christ, thus bringing them onto a path towards 
union with God in love.
Third, the problem of shame is resolved. Even if guilt is resolved, a 
person can still live in shame for being the sort of person who did the 
wrong she did, or was wronged as she was, or who has some defect of 
10Stump, Atonement, 368.
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nature, or who is part of a sinful group. Christ’s atonement resolves shame 
because through his passion and death he comes to unite himself with 
people exactly in the conditions that lead them to be shamed. And since 
God is the highest good, those who are shamed have their shame defeated 
by having some other feature in virtue of which they are more supremely 
honored (what could be more honoring than being united with God?) and 
where that feature is possessed in part because of their source of shame. 
Stump writes, “true honor, which is the defeat of shame, results from a 
person’s allying his truest or deepest self with the God who joins himself 
on the cross to every post-Fall person and shares all that is in that person’s 
psyche, including the shame.”11
Fourth, the problem of the stain on the soul is resolved. A human will 
always remember having sinned in the ways he did, and he will always 
remember them as wrongful. But through Christ’s atonement his memory 
of those sins will be transformed. “The remembered wrongful acts lost 
their power to produce pain in virtue of being wrongful, because they 
have become interwoven into a story of love that is worth prizing.”12 And 
the stain on the soul that results from ruptured relationships with humans 
can begin to be resolved through the moral transformation, repentance, 
and acts of satisfaction that a wrongdoer will perform in virtue of the faith 
they have been brought to through Christ’s atonement. Some of these rela-
tionships may never be reconciled in our mortal lives, but they can start to 
move on that path as much as possible during our mortal lives, and they 
may be restored fully in the afterlife provided the victims of our wrongdo-
ing open themselves to reconciliation.
Thus go, in summary form, the main elements of Stump’s Marian the-
ory of the atonement. Each element is discussed in much greater detail in 
the book, supported and elucidated with various distinctions and exam-
ples involving her favorite pair, Jerome and Paula. We will engage some 
of the details in later sections—in particular, her views on forgiveness and 
love, how she distinguishes her view from Anselmian views, her views 
about surrender and its role in justification, and her views about how 
Christ’s mind-reading of human sin contributes to atonement.
To conclude this section, we want to draw brief attention to a couple of 
additional pieces that aren’t strictly speaking part of the Marian theory, 
but that build upon and justify it. First, Stump has a chapter in which she 
discusses how suffering and the Eucharist can assist people in maintain-
ing their surrender to God. She argues, following her work in Wandering 
in Darkness, that suffering can be a medicine that draws humans into a 
closer relationship with God, which is the greatest good for a human. She 
also argues that receiving the Eucharist is also a kind of medicine that 
can remind us of Christ’s love while also enabling us to re-enact our orig-




because, through transubstantiation and ET-simultaneity (that all events 
are simultaneous in God’s life) we take in us the Christ who is (in the 
eternal sense of “is”) suffering on the cross. Second, in the final chapter, 
Stump takes on what many readers may well think is the main objection 
to her view—how does it account for the clear Biblical notion that Christ 
is a sacrifice? She argues, inspired by Moshe Halbertal’s work on sacrifice, 
that Biblical sacrifices are a gift from a small creature to a much greater 
being that aim to allay the anxiety and distrust that sinful humans feel 
before God. On her view, Christ’s atonement is a sacrifice because it is a 
gift to God (paradoxically offered by God himself) that softens human 
hearts, opening them up to surrender to God, thus reducing their anxiety 
and distrust.
Now that the Marian theory has been described and explained, we turn 
to some questions and objections.
2. Does Love Require Forgiveness?
Stump decisively contrasts her Marian view (which she considers to be 
a kind of Thomistic view) with what she calls “Anselmian” interpreta-
tions of the atonement. According to Stump, the “central and irremedia-
ble problem” with Anselmian interpretations is that they are inconsistent 
with God’s love.13 The problem that Stump identifies has its basis in the 
connection that she posits between love and forgiveness. On Stump’s 
view, “[W]hatever exactly is required for morally appropriate forgiveness, 
it must involve some species of love for the person in need of forgive-
ness.”14 In particular, Stump claims that the absence of either of the desires 
constitutive of love—the desire for the good of the beloved and the desire 
for union with the beloved—undermines forgiveness, and more strongly, 
in an endnote, she says that, on her view, love is both necessary and suffi-
cient for forgiveness, even though they are not reducible to one another.15 
Stump then says that love is obligatory, and so “[g]iven the connection 
between love and forgiveness, it follows that forgiveness is also obliga-
tory in the same way and to the same extent.”16 The upshot, according to 
Stump, is that God must forgive unilaterally and unconditionally in order 
to be perfectly loving. Because God does not forgive unilaterally and 
unconditionally on Anselmian interpretations of the atonement (because 
they claim that God’s forgiveness requires the atonement), Stump claims 
that God is not perfectly loving on Anselmian interpretations. If she is 
correct, that would be devastating for those interpretations.
We think that this objection to Anselmian interpretations does not suc-
ceed for a few reasons. To start, for the sake of argument, assume Stump’s 
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obligatory because love is. Contrary to Stump, it does not follow from 
the fact that forgiveness is obligatory that God forgives unconditionally. 
Of course, if forgiveness is obligatory, God cannot impose conditions on 
potential recipients of forgiveness without thereby violating the obligation 
to forgive, since presumably some potential recipients of forgiveness 
would fail to meet those conditions and God would not then forgive them. 
However, God could impose conditions on himself without violating the 
moral obligation to forgive as long as he meets those conditions. And that 
is exactly what proponents of Anselmian interpretations can reasonably 
say. They can say that God’s forgiveness requires, say, God’s receiving 
what is owed to him due to sin, but since God meets this condition in the 
atonement, then God meets his moral obligation to forgive because, in 
response to the atonement, he forgives everyone.
Next, we think that Stump is wrong to posit such a tight connection 
between love and forgiveness. To see why, consider first Stump’s discus-
sion of hatred. According to Stump, there are two kinds of hatred, one 
opposed to love and one a species of love. These two kinds of hatred, 
she says, both involve the desire not to be united with the other, but they 
differ in what they ultimately desire. For the hatred that is a species of 
love, Stump says that “[i]t is a matter of desiring not to be united with a 
wrongdoer now, when he is bad enough that the alienation of others is the 
best thing for him in the circumstances, and one wants this alienation from 
him as the best for him in the hope of ultimate union with him.”17 This kind 
of hatred is a species of love, according to Stump, because the two desires 
of love—the desire for the other’s good and the desire for union with the 
other—are there. It is just that alienation or distance, rather than union, is 
desired for the present, whereas union is desired ultimately. In contrast, 
for the hatred that is not a species of love, one desires what is ultimately 
bad for the other and desires not to be united with the other ever.
Assuming Stump’s view of love, we think that it is plausible to say 
something similar about unforgiveness: there is a kind of unforgiveness 
that is opposed to love and a kind of unforgiveness that is a species of 
love. The unforgiveness that is a species of love would be a matter of desir-
ing not to have union and so not to reconcile with the other now, while 
desiring ultimate union and reconciliation with the other and desiring the 
ultimate flourishing of the other. The unforgiveness opposed to love, in 
contrast, would involve desiring not to have union and reconciliation with 
the other ever and desiring what is ultimately bad for the other.
If there is a kind of unforgiveness that is a species of love, then Stump 
cannot successfully claim that forgiveness is “obligatory in the same way 
and to the same extent” as love. This would leave room for proponents of 
Anselmian views to claim that God can be perfectly loving even if the atone-
ment is a condition of God’s forgiveness, as long as God’s unwillingness 
17Stump, Atonement, 85–86, italics in original.
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to forgive without the atonement would be a species of love. Would it? We 
think that proponents of Anselmian views could reasonably make such a 
claim, given human sinfulness. Given human sinfulness, it is reasonable 
to suppose that God would desire not to be united and reconciled to us 
as we are in our pre-justification state while also desiring ultimately to be 
united and reconciled with us and desiring our ultimate flourishing. In 
fact, proponents of the Anselmian views could then say that it is precisely 
because of God’s ultimate desires—i.e., his love for us—that he does the 
work of atonement.
Finally, we think that Stump conflates forgiveness with being forgiv-
ing or “forgivingness,” where the latter is a state of character, a dispo-
sition or orientation to forgive when it is morally right or morally good 
to forgive.18 Surely a perfectly loving God has such a disposition or ori-
entation maximally. After all, a loving being is a forgiving being, and so 
a perfectly loving being is a perfectly forgiving being. But a perfectly 
forgiving being may refuse to forgive in some particular case because 
it is not morally right or morally good to forgive in that particular case. 
Thus proponents of Anselmian views may say that God is perfectly for-
giving but does not forgive us without the atonement on the grounds 
that it is not morally right or morally good for God to forgive us without 
the atonement, since simply forgiving us would not, say, uphold God’s 
justice or would, say, undermine God’s moral goodness and authority 
because he would not then uphold the moral status of the victims of 
wrongdoing.19
This point ties to the above point because, if God’s forgiveness is not 
morally right or good without the atonement, then God’s unforgiveness 
without the atonement would presumably be a species of love. He would 
desire not to have union and reconciliation with us unconditionally, with-
out the atonement, for reasons like the kind mentioned above, but he 
would desire to have union and reconciliation with us ultimately, which is 
why he does the work of the atonement. With the distinction between for-
giveness and being forgiving, we can add that God’s unforgiveness with-
out the atonement would then be consistent both with his being perfectly 
loving and with his being perfectly forgiving.
 For the above reasons, we think that Stump’s central objection to 
Anselmian interpretations of the atonement fails. This objection relies on 
a tight connection between love and forgiveness, and we have good rea-
son to think that (a) this tight connection does not actually undermine 
Anselmian interpretations, as Stump claims, and (b) we should reject this 
tight connection anyway.
18For a valuable essay that discusses forgivingness, see Nigel Biggar 2001, “Forgiveness 
in the Twentieth Century.”
19For an argument for the latter idea, see Strabbing 2016, “The Permissibility of the 
Atonement as Penal Substitution.”
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3. Must Stump Reject the Heart of Anselmian Views?
We have just argued that Stump’s main objection to Anselmian interpre-
tations of the atonement fails. In this section, we argue that Stump’s inter-
pretation and Anselmian interpretations of the atonement may actually 
complement each other.
Stump says that all versions of Anselmian interpretations of the atone-
ment make two central claims. “First, without Christ’s making amends to 
God, God would not forgive or accept being reconciled with them. And, 
second, the main (or only) point of Christ’s atonement is to satisfy a condi-
tion needed for God’s forgiveness and reconciliation.”20 Her interpretation 
clearly rejects both of these claims. She thinks that God unilaterally and 
universally forgives and accepts reconciliation with everyone. To accept 
reconciliation, for Stump, is to have a desire for reconciliation that would 
be efficacious in producing reconciliation so long as nothing outside of 
the willer prevents reconciliation. Therefore, since God unilaterally and 
universally forgives and accepts reconciliation, atonement has nothing 
to do with satisfying a condition for either of these states. On her view 
atonement has more to do with effecting a union of love between God and 
humanity.
Although Stump’s description of Anselmian interpretations is certainly 
accurate with respect to many views, and although it is in a certain sense 
accurate with respect to Anselm’s view, it isn’t quite apt to the heart of 
Anselm’s view. This isn’t a merely scholarly point about how to character-
ize Anselm and views like his. The heart of Anselm’s view has something 
quite plausible about it; indeed, Stump’s own interpretation naturally sup-
ports the heart of Anselm’s view. Stump’s interpretation, we think, would 
be better presented as a synthesis of Anselmian and Thomistic approaches 
rather than as a decisive move away from Anselmian approaches toward 
a Thomistic approach.
It is true that Anselm asserts Stump’s first central claim of Anselmian 
approaches: that without Christ’s making amends to God, God would not 
forgive human sin. However, Anselm describes the goal of Christ’s work 
in several different ways, not just as doing something necessary to obtain 
forgiveness. He also describes the goal as “the restoration of mankind,”21 
as humans obtaining a “state of blessed happiness,”22 as “being received 
into heaven,”23 and as being reconciled with God.24 Here are just a few apt 
quotes. Anselm discusses whether mankind can be saved without recom-
pense for sin and he says, “it is not fitting, then, for God to receive into 
heaven . . . a human sinner who has not paid recompense. For truth does 
not allow him to be raised up to equality with the blessed ones,” nor, he 
20Stump, Atonement, 74.
21Anselm 1998, Cur Deus Homo, I.3, I.9.
22Anselm 1998, Cur Deus Homo, I.10; I.24.
23Anselm 1998, Cur Deus Homo, I.19.
24Anselm 1998, Cur Deus Homo, I.21, I.22, I.23.
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later states, “to any state of blessedness whatsoever, even to that which he 
enjoyed before he committed sin.”25 Here, Anselm states that recompense 
is needed not for forgiveness but for being received into heaven and for 
having a state of blessedness, including the state had before committing 
sin. He later says, “Judge for yourself whether it is not contrary to the 
honor of God that man should be reconciled with him so long as he is 
subject to the charge of having inflicted this insult upon God.”26 Here, the 
lack of recompense stands in the way of reconciliation, not forgiveness. 
Lastly, in a fascinating passage that is often overlooked by commentators, 
he considers a scenario in which God forgives people who cannot repay 
what they owe to him. About people who are so forgiven he says,
So long, however, as he does not repay, he will either be wishing to repay, 
or not wishing to do so. But in the event that he has a desire to do what he 
is incapable of doing, he will be a person in want; in the event that he does 
not have this desire, he will be a wrongdoer. . . . Now, whether he is in want 
or whether he is a wrongdoer—in neither case will he be blessedly happy.27
Here, again, the goal that a lack of recompense stands in the way of is 
blessed happiness, not forgiveness. And someone who is unilaterally for-
given without having been able to offer recompense is incapable of blessed 
happiness because he will want to have given recompense. Indeed, it 
seems, he will want to have given recompense because he will rightly 
judge that his wrongdoing was severe enough that recompense is called 
for to honor God.
So, for Anselm, recompense isn’t needed so much for forgiveness or for 
God’s accepting reconciliation with humans, as for the state of achieving 
blessed happiness in reconciliation with God—i.e., for the state of actually 
being reconciled. In fact, it is not clear that Anselm would disagree with 
Stump’s claim that God’s love requires that he forgive unilaterally—in her 
sense of “forgiveness”—for Anselm seems to have something quite differ-
ent in mind by the notion of forgiveness. In I.24, just below the passage 
we quoted above, Anselm says, “we are talking about that final mercy, 
whereby, after this life, he makes a human being blessedly happy. That 
this state of bliss ought not to be given to anyone whose sins have not been 
utterly forgiven, and that this forgiveness ought not to happen except on 
repayment of the debt which is owed.”28 The sort of forgiveness he has in 
mind, being “utterly forgiven,” seems to be something that involves the 
one being forgiven completely separating himself from sin as much pos-
sible, and it seems closely connected with shortly attaining blessed hap-
piness. Forgiveness of this sort seems more like God’s saying to a sinful 
human, “welcome to heaven.” This kind of forgiveness obviously isn’t 
given unilaterally. So, for all we’ve seen, perhaps Anselm could accept 
25Anselm 1998, Cur Deus Homo, I.19.
26Anselm 1998, Cur Deus Homo, I.22.
27Anselm 1998, Cur Deus Homo, I.24.
28Anselm 1998, Cur Deus Homo, I.24.
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that God unilaterally forgives in the sense of forgiveness that Stump has 
in mind; and perhaps God accepts reconciliation in the sense that he is 
ready to reconcile with humans and reconciliation will occur so long as 
nothing outside of him prevents it from happening. Until humans offer 
recompense, they simply will not be blessedly happy because they will 
judge that they haven’t properly honored God; this would be a fact about 
a human person that prevents reconciliation.
The quoted passage from I.24 gets to the heart of Anselm’s view about 
atonement and recompense: humans need to offer recompense to God 
because they could not be blessedly happy in reconciliation with God 
without having offered him recompense, and this is so because, in their 
love of God, they will judge that they owe him recompense for the sins 
they committed against him. There is something deeply plausible about 
this. Indeed, Stump herself admits as much. She writes, “in cases of seri-
ous wrongdoing, something in addition to forgiveness may be necessary 
for reconciliation. Making amends’ is one customary name for the addi-
tional element that, added to repentance, can effect reconciliation; “satis-
faction” is another.”29 Some wrongs—like theft, serious injury, spreading 
lies about someone, deeply unjust discrimination, for example—are so 
bad that repentance and efforts to become a better person simply aren’t 
enough to reconcile with the victim of the wrong act. To be reconciled 
with the victim, one needs to honor the victim properly as a person with 
dignity. To honor them seems to require, in these sorts of cases, that one 
participate in undoing or redressing the harm or injustice in some way. 
Indeed, if I have wronged someone in one of these ways and genuinely 
desire to be reconciled with them, I will deeply desire to make amends/
offer recompense/offer satisfaction (we are treating these three phrases 
as equivalent for present purposes). Making amends is part of the way 
that I can express to the person that I respect and honor them as a person 
with dignity.
If Stump grants that we owe recompense to our fellow humans for 
the wrongs we have committed against them, why shouldn’t we also 
owe recompense to God? Of course we can’t harm God in the way we 
can harm our fellow humans, but we can treat him unjustly and we can, 
as Stump herself emphasizes, frustrate God’s good plans for humanity. 
Furthermore, harming one of God’s children is a great offense toward God 
as well. So there seems to be just as good a case that we should make 
amends to God as there is that we should make amends to the human 
victims of our wrongdoing.
How could Jesus’s death on a cross possibly make amends for human 
sin? Stump herself offers an answer that an Anselmian could take on board:
Christ’s offering to human sufferers something that defeats their suffering 
and their guilt and unites them with God is itself also a gift given to God by 
Christ’s atonement . . . in love for his people, God does nevertheless have a 
29Stump, Atonement, 101.
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desire that can go unfulfilled, namely desire for union with human beings. 
And so the spiritual regeneration offered to all post-Fall people in Christ’s 
atonement is a worthy gift . . . for a perfect and perfectly loving God.30
The Marian interpretation describes various ways in which Christ’s atone-
ment brings about and deepens union with God. That Christ does this to 
bring humans to God is itself a fitting satisfaction for human sin. It is, as 
Stump says, the greatest gift anyone could offer to God: restoring into 
union with him the people he always greatly desired in love.
Does what Stump describes as the second central claim of Anselmian 
interpretations—that the main or sole purpose of Christ’s atonement is to 
make amends—rule out this appropriation of aspects of the Marian inter-
pretation? No, because the nature of the amends described includes bring-
ing about union (or making available a distinctively effective means for 
bring about union), with all that involves, with God. Furthermore, it isn’t 
clear that Anselmian views must accept this second central claim. The dia-
lectical structure of Cur Deus Homo might be misleading here. Anselm’s 
stated purpose is to explain why it is necessary that Christ become man 
and through his death restore life to the world.31 Notice: his goal is not 
to explain everything that Christ’s incarnation and death contribute to 
human restoration. It is just to explain why his incarnation and death were 
necessary. Anselm develops a line of argument, using the notion of satis-
faction, to explain why Christ’s death was necessary. But that simply does 
not imply that the only or main thing that Christ’s death does by way of 
restoring humanity is to offer satisfaction. And in Anselm’s prayers and 
his Meditation on Human Redemption, he shows he is quite sensitive to 
many other things that Christ’s incarnation and death do to bring about 
human restoration.
In sum, we suggest that the heart of Anselm’s interpretation contains 
the plausible idea that full reconciliation with God requires that humans 
offer something to make amends to God for their sins. Humans wouldn’t 
be blessedly happy if they could not offer amends, for they would not 
regard themselves as properly honoring God. Furthermore, Stump’s inter-
pretation can easily incorporate this plausible idea; she already accepts 
the idea that some wrongs are serious enough that reconciliation requires 
making amends, and she already accepts that Christ’s work makes 
amends to God for human sin (amends that can vicariously count as sat-
isfaction for humans who appropriately identify with Christ’s work). She 
does present various other problems for Anselmian interpretations; we 
think most of those other problems can be surmounted, especially given 
that Anselmians can incorporate the Marian interpretation’s idea for how 
Christ’s work makes amends and given that Anselmians needn’t endorse 
Stump’s second claim about Anselmian interpretations. Stump’s Marian 
theory thus is better seen not as a repudiation of Anselmian approaches, 
30Stump, Atonement, 372.
31Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, I.1.
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but as a synthesis of Anselmian and Thomistic insights. In addition, this 
way of seeing her interpretation is perhaps better from the perspective of 
tradition. The heart of the Anselmian view did not originate with Anselm 
and has been explicated and endorsed across many theological traditions 
within Christianity. Given that God guides the Church, it would seem 
more likely that the true account of the atonement would incorporate 
rather than repudiate the Anselmian heart.
4. Surrender and Justification
Stump endorses what she takes to be Aquinas’s view of justification. On 
this view, recall, our justification is a matter of forming a global second-or-
der desire for a will that wills the good, which justifies us because it begins 
the process of moral and spiritual regeneration. (Sanctification, recall, is 
then the process of undergoing moral and spiritual regeneration, which 
requires maintaining this global second-order desire.) How do we form 
this global second-order desire? According to Stump, this desire cannot 
originate in our will because “[i]f what needs to be explained is the ulti-
mate origin of a moral and spiritual rebirth, then it is hard to see how it 
could be explained as a function of the will of the person whose moral 
and spiritual regeneration it is. As I explained above, any will that wants 
to will the good is already in the process of regeneration.”32 Thus, Stump 
says, this second-order desire must originate from outside of our will. On 
her view, God acts on our will to produce this second-order desire, and 
this action is God’s operative grace. Yet, importantly, Stump says that God 
cannot act against our will, and so he cannot produce this second-order 
desire in us while we are resisting God’s grace.
The question, then, is how this second-order desire can originate solely 
from outside of our will without God acting against our will. Stump’s 
solution, which she attributes to Aquinas, is to say that God gives us this 
global second-order desire when and only when our will is quiescent—i.e., 
when our will is inactive or turned off with respect to God’s grace, neither 
refusing nor accepting it.
On the face of it, this idea sounds a bit unsettling. A will may become 
quiescent towards God’s grace for different reasons or even no reason at 
all, and how a will becomes quiescent seems relevant to the acceptability 
of God’s infusing operative grace into our will. After all, plausibly, we 
should consent to God’s infusing our will with operative grace in order 
for it to be morally permissible for God to do that, and merely having an 
inactive will towards God’s grace does not rise to the level of consent. 
To put the point another way, Stump understandably does not want to 
accept that God violates our will in giving us operative grace, but how is 
it better to say that God waits until our will is switched off? It seems that, 
in order for God’s infusion of operative grace to be acceptable, we must 
32Stump, Atonement, 206.
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turn off our wills because we desire God to infuse us with his grace and 
reasonably believe that turning off our wills is the only way to make that 
happen. The upshot is that it does not seem right to say simply that God 
gives us operative grace when and only when our will is neither refusing 
nor accepting God’s grace. There must be some role for consent, and thus 
our motivation for ceasing to resist God’s grace matters.
This is perhaps what Stump actually has in mind. After all, to illustrate 
the state of quiescence in the will, she draws the following analogy: Jerome 
is having a dangerous allergic reaction to a bee sting, but because he has 
an extreme fear of needles, he fights the injection that has the antidote that 
he needs. In the example, Jerome cannot bring himself to accept the injec-
tion, but he can bring himself to stop resisting it, becoming quiescent with 
respect to it.33 Stump then says that, like for the bee sting victim Jerome, 
the inactivity at issue in quiescence of the will “is a surrender, not a mere 
calm or indifference, because in moving into that quiescence Paula feels 
her quiescence as a letting go of resistance to God and God’s grace, just as 
the bee-sting victim understands his quiescence as a letting go of resist-
ance to the injection he fears.”34 Again, we think that more needs to be in 
place than just “feeling a letting go of resistance to God and God’s grace,” 
since by itself that is not enough for consent. A person’s motivation for let-
ting go of that resistance matters. However, on the natural way of under-
standing the bee sting victim analogy, Jerome consents to the injection. 
The right motivation for consent is plausibly there. After all, it is reason-
able to think that Jerome becomes quiescent with respect to the injection 
because (a) he desires to cease resisting the injection and (b) his desire to 
cease resisting the injection stems from his desire to receive the injection 
plus his belief that ceasing to resist the injection is the only way that he 
can receive the injection. Thus, his becoming quiescent with respect to the 
injection is plausibly rooted in his desire to receive the injection.
Analogously, then, Stump’s idea may be this: God infuses us with oper-
ative grace when and only when our will becomes quiescent as a result 
of a desire to cease resisting God’s grace, where this desire in turn stems 
from a desire to receive God’s grace along with the belief that ceasing to 
resist God’s grace is the only way that we can receive it. If that is what 
Stump has in mind, if that is what surrendering to God’s love is, then we 
plausibly have the motivation required for consent. But if Stump does not 
require this motivation for ceasing to resist God’s grace, then we think that 
her view of justification is problematic.
If we are right in what we say above, then God’s giving us the global 
second-order desire for a will that wills the good is a direct result of our 
wanting to receive God’s grace and so wanting to receive that global sec-
ond-order desire. Therefore, our receiving that second-order desire (if not 
the second-order desire itself) would have some origin in our will. Stump 
33Stump, Atonement, 208.
34Stump, Atonement, 209.
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may accept that result, even intend it, but we are not sure. It depends 
upon what exactly she means when she says that “[i]f what needs to be 
explained is the ultimate origin of a moral and spiritual rebirth, then it is 
hard to see how it could be explained as a function of the will of the person 
whose moral and spiritual regeneration it is.”35 If we are right in what we 
say above, then Stump should say that the ultimate origin of a moral and 
spiritual rebirth would not just be a function of the will of the person; it 
would instead be a function of God’s responding to a person’s desire for 
grace, a desire which motivates the person to enter the state of quiescence. 
Only then do we get a picture in which God obtains the appropriate con-
sent from us to infuse us with operative grace.
The above discussion took for granted Stump’s claim that, without 
God’s operative grace infusing us, we cannot have the global second-or-
der desire for a will that wills the good. However, we are not sure that we 
should accept this claim. Recall that, on Stump’s Thomistic interpretation, 
when we are motivated to do something, the intellect presents it to us as 
good, and the will is then attracted to it because it is presented as good. We 
therefore have a global first-order desire for the good and to do good; it is 
just that our sinfulness keeps us from recognizing the good, resulting in 
wrongdoing. Given that we have this global first-order desire for the good, 
we think that, contrary to Stump, we plausibly also have a second-order 
desire to desire the good already, without God having to give it to us.
Why do we think this? We think this because people just naturally have 
higher-order desires. We form desires about our desires. We want certain 
desires to lead to action and other desires not to lead to action. As a result, 
it is implausible that we lack a second-order desire with respect to our 
first-order desire for the good. Further, it is implausible that we would 
want our first-order desire for the good to be defeated by contrary moti-
vation. Such a second-order desire would not sit well with the human 
tendency to see and justify our actions as good. The upshot is that it is 
reasonable to think that we not only have a global first-order desire for the 
good but also have a second-order desire that our global first-order desire 
for the good lead to action. We want, so to speak, our desire for the good 
to “win out” against any contrary motivation. If this is right, then it is rea-
sonable to think that we already have, pre-justification, the second-order 
desire for a will that wills the good, and so Stump’s account of justifica-
tion as God’s giving us this desire would be implausible. Furthermore, 
if we already have the second-order desire for a will that wills the good 
pre-justification, it would not be plausible to say that Christ suffers and 
dies on the cross in part to motivate us to acquire such a second-order 
desire. Some revision in her account of the atonement would be called for. 
Perhaps she could appeal to some other mental state produced in justifica-
tion in place of the second-order desire for a will that wills that good, e.g., 
ceasing to resist God’s will for us (appropriately motivated).
35Stump, Atonement, 206.
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5. Mind-Reading and Pre-Justification Sin
One final question that we have is whether, on the Marian interpretation, 
the atonement successfully deals with our pre-justification sin. We worry 
that it does not because mutual indwelling—the goal of the atonement on 
the Marian interpretation—does not seem to require Christ’s mind-read-
ing our pre-justification sins. To see this, recall that mutual indwelling 
requires closeness and shared attention. Neither closeness nor shared 
attention require that Christ take on, via mind-reading, pre-justification 
human sin. Closeness, recall, is a function of sharing your thoughts and 
feelings and what you care about with the other, as well as desiring the 
other wholeheartedly, and closeness with God is not possible pre-justi-
fication because we are not integrated around the good. Further, shared 
attention with God is not possible pre-justification because, lacking the 
Holy Spirit, we cannot mind-read God. Stump acknowledges all of this, 
noting that what prevents mutual indwelling is on our side. In particular, 
she thinks that
[O]n the cross . . . Christ establishes at one and the same time an indwell-
ing in God of all human beings even in their sinfulness. Then, when at any 
other time a human person Paula surrenders to God in faith and is open to 
God, the circuit for mutual indwelling between God and Paula is completed, 
because then the Holy Spirit comes to indwell in Paula.36
Yet why should God establish “an indwelling in God of all human beings 
even in their sinfulness” for humans in their pre-justification state, such 
that humans are just left to “complete the circuit”? After all, here is another 
possibility that brings about mutual indwelling: God stands ready and 
willing to be close to us and share attention with us in our pre-justification 
state, and our indwelling in God and God’s indwelling in us both take 
place at the moment of justification. On this alternative, the circuit is com-
pleted from both sides at the moment of justification, and God, due to his 
love for us, stands ready to complete his side before we are justified. The 
fact that this alternative is available shows that Christ need not suffer the 
agony of bearing our pre-justification sin in order for mutual indwelling 
to occur. Instead, it would only require him to mind-read our post-justifi-
cation sin in order for us to have closeness and shared attention with him. 
That is a problem, we think, since the Marian interpretation then seems to 
obviate the need for Christ to deal with pre-justification sin even though 
the atonement is traditionally thought to deal with pre-justification sin. It 
also leaves Stump with the question of why, on her account, Christ mind-
reads all human psyches at all times, if that is not necessary to establish 
mutual indwelling.
Stump could respond in either of two ways. First, she could claim 
that the atonement need not deal with pre-justification sin and revise her 
position to say that Christ does not mind-read all human psyches at all 
36Stump, Atonement, 166.
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times. We think that this approach is unpromising and would not appeal 
to Stump, given that she rightly desires to explain “the theological claim 
that on the cross Christ bore the sins of all human beings at all times.”37
Second, she could respond that Christ has good reason to mind-read 
both our pre-justification and post-justification sin. What kind of reason 
could that be? One option is that mind-reading the sins of everyone at all 
times indirectly contributes to people’s justification, since people will more 
easily find their hearts melted by the love that Christ shows us through his 
willingness to mind-read us at every moment. This response might work. 
Yet, it also raises a concern. Plausibly, what melts our hearts is God’s will-
ingness to suffer in order to do what it takes to achieve mutual indwelling 
with us. Why would God’s taking on more suffering than necessary to 
achieve mutual indwelling further contribute to melting our hearts?
Another reason could be that Christ’s mind-reading all of our sin, 
including our pre-justification sin, makes us closer to God or increases 
the shared attention that we experience with him post-justification. Yet 
that does not seem quite right either. Closeness with God is a function 
of our sharing our thoughts and feelings and what we care about with 
him, which would be different post-justification, when we have begun our 
moral and spiritual transformation. And shared attention is a second-per-
sonal presence, and it is implausible that the depth of this second-personal 
presence depends upon Christ’s mind-reading us at times when we are 
unable to experience it.
We think that one potentially good reason for Christ to mind-read all of 
our sin, both pre-justification and post-justification, can be found by combin-
ing the Marian interpretation with an Anselmian interpretation. If bearing 
all of human sin is necessary for Christ to make amends to God, or if pun-
ishment for all sin is necessary in order to satisfy God’s justice, then it would 
make sense for Christ to suffer the agony of bearing both pre-justification 
and post-justification sin. Hence, if our argument in this section is right, we 
may have provided another reason to see the Marian interpretation as com-
plementary to Anselmian interpretations. Together, they could produce a 
powerful interpretation explaining why mutual indwelling requires Christ 
to bear all sin by mind-reading the psyches of all people at all times.
Although we have raised a few objections to Stump’s interpretation of 
the atonement, those objections do not detract from Stump’s incredible 
achievement with this volume. We believe this interpretation contains 
many insights; it will be an enduring contribution to philosophical and 
theological work on the atonement for years to come.
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